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'ummary  findings
rhe transition from plan to market provides a rare  help coordinate production  and trade emerge
opportunity for insight into the endogenous  spontaneously in a widely "disorganized" environment.
development of economic institutions. Economic  Using a largely unexplored set of firm-level data, they
activities under the Soviet regime were coordinated  by a  document the emergence of business associations at the
c  entral authority. Soviet coordinating mechanisms were  beginning of the transition and provide evidence that
disrupted during the transition period, leading to an  these new coordinating institutions mitigated the initial
ncrease in firms' transaction costs.  decline in output. Building on the growing literature on
Blanchard and Kremer (1997), among others,  complexity and transaction costs, they interpret  the
~mphasize  the negative impact of this "disorganization"  emergence of these informal institutions as the firms'
Dn  output behavior at the beginning of the transition.  rational attempt to coordinate activities in a
Although their argument is correct, Recanatini and  decentralized economy.
Ryterman believe that their work and similar analyses  In other words, the creation of complex organizations
stop short of fully characterizing the transition by  such as associations is the spontaneous result of a natural
concentrating only on reform's disruptive effects.  tendency in every system to create order at the edge of
Recanatini and Ryterman start where the earlier work  chaos. Business  associations are more likely to emerge
ends, examining the business associations that emerged  where there is disorder, to provide their members with
spontaneously in response to the transition's challenges.  stability, coordination,  and the information needed to
They provide empirical evidence that institutions that  improve performance.
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Abstract
The transition  from plan to maret  provides a  rare oppomtunity  for insight into the endogenous
development  of economic  institutions. Economic  activities  during the Soviet  regime  were coordinated  by a
central authority. These coordinating  mechanisms  were disrupted  during  the transition  period,  leading  to an
increase  in the transaction  costs for finms. Blanchard  and Kremer  (1997),  among  others,  emphasize  the negative
impact of this 'disorganization"  on output behavior  at the beginning  of transition. Though this argument  is
conrect,  we believe that this  and similar works stop short of  a  fuller characterization  of  transition by
concentrating  only  on the disruptive  effects  of the reform  process.
This paper begins  where the former works end by examining  one of the key institutions  that have
emerged  spontaneously  in response  to the challenges  of transition:  business  associations.  Its main  contribution  is
to provide  empirical  evidence  that institutions  that help coordinate  production  and trade spontaneously  emerge
in an environment  characterized  bywidespread  "disorganization".  Using  a largely  unexplored,  finn-level  data set,
we document  the emergence  of business  associations  at the beginning  of transition  and provide  evidence  that
these new coordinating  institutions  mitigated  the initial  oUtpUt  decline. Building  on the growing  literature  on
transaction  costs and complexity,  we interpret  the emergence  of these infomial  institutions  as the firns' rational
response  to coordinate  activities  in a decentralized  economy.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The  transition  from  plan  to  market provides  a  rare opportunity  for  insight into  the
endogenous development of economic institutions. Although a number of scholars have written on
the  endogenous emergence of economic institutions, 3 few have either discussed this issue in the
specific context of transition 4 or focused on the link between institutional development and market
failures. In this paper, we do both by examining one of the key institutional  responses to the shock
of the transition process: the organization of firms into formal and informal networks, which we
refer to generically  as business associations.  Much has been written about this phenomenon  (for
example, see Johnson,  1997),  but little empirical  evidence has been provided on their impact on the
performance of firms in the context of transition. Exceptions to this are Perotti and Gelfer (1998)
and McMillan and Woodruff (1999). The former examines  the role of groups in the allocation of
credit in transition economies, 5 while the latter looks at the link between firm relationships and
informal  credit. 6 Credit  reallocation, however,  is  but  one  of  several roles played  by  these
associations, as we explain below.  This paper aims to  offer a more encompassing analysis, by
examining the impact of membership in associations  on the overall  performance of the firm.
The beginning of the transition was marked by a deep and, in some cases, enduring output
collapse.  Scholars attribute the observed decline to  a number of different causes:  a decline of
3 Seminal  contributors  to our understanding  of the theoryof organization  include:  Coase,  Williamson,  North, and Grief.
4 Exceptions  include  Ickes  and Ryterman  (1995),  Gaddy  and  Ickes  (1998),  CDmmander  (1998),  Pinto (1999),  and others  who study  the
evolution  of barter,  commercial  paper, and trade credit as mechanisms  to conserve  on the need for firms  to fully  adjust  to market-
based  competition.
5 The authors  find that firms in  groups have  easier  access  to finance  for investment  than independent  firms.
6 The authors  find that in Vietnam  access  to trade credit  is positively  related  with the length of the relationship,  the level  of search
costs faced  bythe firm,  and membership  in business  networks.
1production  of goods during  the regime  of central  planning  but subsequently  in excess  supply  (Berg,
1994);  mismeasurement  of GDP due to a shift from official  to unofficial  activities  (Kaufmann  and
Kaliberda, 1995); inconsistent and  unsustainable  macroeconomic  policy (IMF, 1995); credit
contraction  (Calvo  and Coricelli,  1992);  coordination  failures  due to an institutional  vacuum  created
by the dismantling  of central planning  institutions  (Murrell,  1992;  Blanchard  and Kremer, 1997;
Recanatini  and Ryternan, 1999);  and rent-seeldng  behavior  (Aslund  et aL,  1996).  The importance  of
each of these arguments  certainly  varies  by country,  but together  they form a common image,  that
transition has produced an uncertain  and somewhat  chaotic environment  in which firms must
modifytheir  organizational,  productive,  and transactional  strategies  or risk  their  own obsolescence.
Blanchard  and Kremer  (1997)  provide  one of the most visible  of these  arguments,  observing
that central planning  was characterized  by highly  specific  relationships  between  firms that were
Intermediated  by central  planning  institutions. The elimination  of these institutions  resulted  in a
breakdown  of relations,  which the authors characterize  as 'disorganization". In our view, this
argument  is correct,  providing  an important  example  of the way in  wich  transiiion  has increased
the cost to finns of transacting.  But, this and simiar arguments stop short of what we believe is a
fuller characterization  of the transition  process,  as one in which the shock waves of the reform
process have  triggered  a search  by finrns  for ways  to suivive  this adversity,  leading  to the emergence
of new institutions. In this paper, we begin where the former arguments  end, by focusing on
business  associations  and providing  empirical  evidence  on their role in mitigating  the  tal output
decline.
Specifically,  we argue  that business  associations  emerge  as a spomitaneous  response  by firms
to address the uncertainty  of transition. We build our argument  intuitively  on the literature  on
2transaction  costs 7 and complexity.  As transition  takes  place,  the existing  relations,  which  guaranteed
the completion of exchanges  during the Soviet era, are broken: disorganization  spreads and
transaction  costs for individual  finns increase. Agents  need now to learn to trade in a new and
uncertain  environment.  In particular,  firms  have  to gather  information  on potential  trading  partners,
such as their location,  their reliability,  their creditworthiness,  and the quality  of their product. This
information  has suddenly  become  scarce  and costly  for finns. They  need  to identify  ways  to obtain
finance  and to ensure  that agreements  into which  they  enter are subsequently  enforced. The initial
absence and the slow introduction  of  market institutions  further exacerbate  these transaction
problems. Some firms react by joining  efforts and sharing  infornation and other resources. This
coordination  of efforts translates  into a decrease  in transaction  costs and an improvement  in
performance  for the members  of these networks.  Associations  can  therefore  be viewed  as a rational
response  of finrs to disorganization  and higher  transaction  costs.
But, if membership  in a business  association  positively  affects a firm's performlance  by
reducing transaction costs, why doesn't every firn  join one?  We propose that  firms are
heterogeneous  in terms of their transaction  technologies.  Some  firms,  in an attempt  to recreate  the
past system,  prefer personalized  exchanges  within  a small,  known  group of agents; other finms,
instead,  prefer  to use impersonal  markets.!  This heterogeneity  in transaction  technologies  helps to
explain  the firm's  initial  decision  to join  an association  at the beginning  of transition. Moreover,  this
heterogeneity  could  have  persisted  because  of the difficulty  of observing  why  certain  firmns  succeed.
In a chaotic  environment,  where firms are experimenting  with a number  of new survival  strategies
simultaneously,  it can be difficult  even  for profitable  firms  to understand  fully  the reasons  for their
own success.
7 We define  'tiansaction  costs' broadly  as search  costs,  bargaining  and decision  costs,  and  policing  and enforcement  costs.
3We test this view  of business  asssociations  using  data  on the characteristics  and performance
of firms in five  Russian  cities. This data set was  constructed  by a team from the World  Bank 9, and
includes  statistics  on the membership  of finns in different  types of business  associations.  The data
were collected  for 1994,  a year  witnessing  active  privatization  and a dramatic  decline  in the volume
of government  subsidies  to firms. These conditions  suggest  that 1994  is precisely  the time period
during  which  we would  expect  firms  to actively  search  for survival  strategies.
We  estimate  a bivariate  model  to jointly  explain  the firm's  probability  to experience  a decline
in output and to join a business  association.  We define  the probability  of decline  in a firm's  output
as a function of changes  in the demand for its products and other characteristics  of the firm,
including  the potential for disorganization  in its relationships  and its membership  in a business
association.  The decision to  join an  association,  in turn, is a  function of  its potential for
disorganization  as well as local incentives  for cooperation  among firms.  The empirical  analysis
supports our intuition:  being a member of a business  association  improves  a firm's performance
significantly.  Moreover,  firms are more likely  to join an association  in regions  where cooperation
among  firms is most likely. Hence,  these results  characterize  the use of associations  by firms as a
mean  to coordinate  activities  by sharing  information  and reducing  transaction  costs.
The novelty  of this work is to suggest  a simple,  yet promising,  framework  of analysis  and
provide  empirical  evidence  of the link  between  institutional  disorganization,  output decline,  and the
endogenous emergence  of new coordinating  institutions. In doing so, this paper offers new
evidence  on the role of spontaneous  institutions  on firm's  performance. The approach  employed
8  See  also Kranton (1998)  for a detailed  discussion  of the coexistence  of different  modes  of exchange.
9 Led by Barry  Ickes Che Pennsylvania  State  University)  and Randi Ryterman  (he  World Banr), with the assistance  of Annette
Brown. The National  Council  for Soviet  and East European  Research  also  provided  funding.
4also helps  begin  thinking  about the causes  triggering  the endogenous  emergence  of these institutions
and their  evolution  over  time.
The rest of the paper is organized  as follows.  Section  2 introduces  some prelimninary
evidence  on business  associations,  and a simple  model  that provides  a framework  for our empirical
analysis  presented  in Section  3.  The concluding  section  discusses  the implications  of our findings
for understanding  the transition  process  and presents  possible  extensions.
2.  WHY Do  ENTERPRISES  JOIN GROUPS?
The change  in regime,  which  occurred  in previously  centrally  planned  economies  in the early
1990s  implied  the destruction  of the old ways  of doing  business  and the creation  of new ones based
on market mechanisms. During the early  years of the Russian  transition,  however, observers
recorded  a new,  unexpected  phenomenon:  the emergence  of business  associations.  In 1994,  nearly
half  of all finns  were members  of some  business  or trading  associations  (see  Table 1).
Some  might  think  that the emergence  of business  associations  in countries  such as Russia  is
not an unlikely  phenomenon. After  all,  the ministries  of the former  Soviet  Union  and its constituent
republics  could  be characterized  as managing  a formal  network  of plants  producing  similar  types of
goods.  Beginning  in the 1960s,  the plants within  ministries  were further organized  into smaller
units, known as production  associations,  which primarily  consisted  of plants  producing  the same
types of goods located  in the same city  or town. In fact, we agree  with this characterization  and
suggest  that the blueprint  for the self-organization  of enterprises  existed  in the Soviet  system  and
possibly  before.
As shown in Table 2, the key organizers  of about half of the associations  were former
ministerial  officials  at the all-union  or republic levels.  As the institutions  of central planning
5were dismantled,  these officials  found themselves  without a public office, but with extensive
experience  in planning  and solving  problems  of production. Many  moved  out of the public  sector
into the non-government  sector,  trying  to coax  finls into joining  associations  that would  help  them
navigate  some of the difficulties  of the transition.
While the propensity  to associate  might be driven by a historical  legacy,  the associations
formed  during  the transition  were  typically  quite  distinct  from their antecedents.  As shown in Table
3, these were no longer  predominantly  comprised  of firns in the same industry  (finrs that post-
1992 became competitors),  but  also included suppliers, customers, and  banks.  This  new
composition  reflected  the expanded  role of associations,  which shifted  from primatily  allocating  a
fixed  stock of inputs among competing  firms in an industry  to helping  firns find and transact in
new input and product markets and finance  their production,  preferably  at below market rates
(Table  4). Associations  also  appear  to provide  its members  with better information  about alternative
trading partners (Table 5).  Using the same data set, Ickes, Ryterman and Tenev (1995) find that
firms that are members of business associations are more likely  to undertake restmcturing activities
than other finrs.
We believe this fundamentally new form of organizing exchange emerged as an efficient
response to the uncertainty of transition.  To make this intuition explicit we introduce a simple,
illustrative model that describes the decision process faced by finns.  We assume that the benefits of
joining an association are uncertain over some horizon and depend on the heterogeneity  existing in
what we define "the transaction technology" of each firm.  The benefits are also a function of the
size of the  association and of the degree of disorganization in the economy.  There are however
some costs associated with becoming a member - an organizational  fee, or the time spent looking
for or formning  the association  itself.
In particular, assume there are N firms in  the economy, who  must decide whether
6or not to join an association.  The decision  concerning  membership  in an association  is made  prior
to the realization  of its returns,  and is made  simnultaneouslyby  all firms.
The benefits  of joining  an association  for a given  firm  are  given  by:
B(A, p) + ei  (1)
where:
- is the degree  of institutional  disorganization  present  in the economy,  E [0,1]
- u is the fraction  of finrs that decide  to join p  [0,1]
- e, is the benefit  specific  to firm  iand
e, E [-E,E] - f(ei)
E(e ) = f  ef  (ei)dej = 0
The variable e,  represents  the firm-specific  benefits from joining an association. We
interpret  these firm-specific  benefits  as arising  from differences  in the transaction  technologies  of
firms. This particular  interpretation  introduces  the idea  that some managers  in transition  economies
may have a so-called 'Soviet  mentality"  in doing business:  they may have very little faith in (or
knowledge  of) market  institutions  and prefer  to use, instead,  personalized  modes  of exchange  (high
e,).  Business  associations  are an example  of these personalized  exchange  institutions. Other
managers,  instead,  less influenced  by the Soviet  legacy,  may prefer impersonal,  market exchanges
and derive,  therefore,  lesser  benefits  from joining  an association  Oow  e1).'"
10  While  we express  the transaction  technology  of the firm in  terms of a managerWs  preferences,  these  preferences  may be reflected  (or
in fact derive  frrro  an organizational  structure  of the firm  Such  structures  are often highly  resistant  to change  (Nelson  and Wmters
1982;  Murrell  1992),  and  can be viewed  as exogenous  characteristics  of the firm.
7B(A, p)  captures possible systemic reasons why a firm may decide to join an association.
When economic activities are highly disorganized and institutions are not developed (high  )",  a
firm may join an association as a means of reducing the costs of search, bargaining,  financing, and
contract enforcement.  Hence, when the degree of disorganization  increases,  the benefits of joining
an association also increase.
The institutional disorganization existing in the economy however is not the  only factor
affecting the  benefits of  joining an association. For  a  given degree of disorganization, firm  As
benefits  are affected by the  number  of finns  also joining an association.  As the  literature on
network externalities  emphasizes (Cooper and John, 1988),  the benefits of being a member could be
increasing in the number  of members because the addition of new members to the  association
facilitates for example the circulation  of information by adding to the diversity  of the experience. In
this case, the system exhibits strategic complementarities. As the number of members continues to
increase, however, the benefits of using a business association may decrease because of congestion
effects.
Each period firm idraws  ei and then makes its decision. Firm iwill join an association if:
B(A,p)+ei  >a
where a  is the cost of joining an association." 2
The fraction of firms joining an association  each period is therefore defined as follows:
*  =  f (ei)de1
where:
It Holding  AI constant
1 2The cost of joining  an association  can be interpreted  in a narrow  or broad sense,  as sirply the nominal  fee for joining  or as the full
cost  of forning and maintaining  the association,  plus the net benefits  of choosing  the next best alternative.
8- e*(  ,p*)  a  B(  ,g*)





if the benefit function B()  is increasing in the degree of institutional  disorganization,  -B  > o,  and
in presence of strategic complementan'ties,  ->  0.  Thus, the firm's decision to join an association
is determined by its degree of disorganization,  the cost of joining an association,  and the existence of
strategic complementarities among its members." 4
3.  BUSINESS  ASSOCIATIONS AND  ENTERPRISE  PERFORMANCE
The previous discussion has emphasized how a change in the coordinating institutions of an
economy, though it initially translates into a  negative shock  may also trigger the  emergence of
altemative, endogenous mechanisms to  coordinate trade among firns.  By focusing on  the early
years of the transition process in Russia, we documented the emergence of business associations.
13In  the  neighborhood  of a locally  stable  equilibriumL  See  Appendix  1  for  the  proof  of  these  results.
14 Though  institutional  disorganization  is an important  factor  in explaining  this  phenomenon,  the degree  of heterogeneity  in the
transaction  technologies  of the firms  may  also  play  a role. It can  be shown  that greater  heterogeneity  in transaction  technology,
measured  by a mean  preserving  spread  in f  (ei ) , increases  the membership  rate  in presence  of strategic  complementarities.  This
could  explain  why  associations  may  be a seemingly  more  important  phenomenon  in some  countries  or regions  within  the same
country  than in others. Other  types  of heterogeneity  related  to the characteristics  of the economic  environment  may  also  affect
membership.  Recently,  Alesina  and  La  Fen-am  (1999)  suggest  that  heterogeneity  in income,  race  and  ethnicity  influences  participation
in social  activities  and  groups.
9We characterize  this phenomenon  as the spontaneous  reaction  of firms  to the dismantling  of Soviet
institutions  and to the coordination  failures  and higher  transaction  costs  which  followed.
But,  does  this  alternative  way of  coordinating  activities improve significantly  firm
performance?  In the following  section,  we explore  the link  between  these informal  institutions  and
firm's  performance  using  our firm  data set. The results  of this empirical  exercise  are starting. Being
a member of a business  association  significandy  improves  a firm's performance,  by reducing  the
probability  of a decline  in production. Moreover,  firms are more likely  to join an association  in
regions where incentives  for cooperation  among  firms are stronger.  Hence, the results of this
estimation  procedure  characterize  the use of associations  by firms as a way  to limit  the (negative)
"disorganization  shock", which followed  the dismantling  of Soviet coordinating  institutions,  by
"self-organizing"  their activities.
3.1  THE  STRUCTURAL MODEL
An  observable implication, which can be  drawn from  our  characterization of  business
associations, is that the decline in output following  the dismantling of Soviet institutions should be
smaUler  for firms which have organized their activities  through business associations.
To  explore the  link between membership and  fimns' performance, we  use  a  data  set
compiled at the end of 1994 by the World Bank  This survey gathered extensive information on 157
enterprises in five Russian provinces between January 1992 and October  1994.  In particular, the
data set  contains infornation  on  firms' performance and  membership in business associations.
10Using  this information,  we construct  two variables,  y, and Assoc,, where y, is an index  for firm i's
growdt  rate,  and is defined  as follows:` 5
- if (y9 - yi91) > 0 then y, =  ;
- if (Yi9  - Yi9')  <  °  then Yi = 1;
where yi' is the level  of production  for firm i at time /, and Assoc, is a dummy  variable
which  takes  value  1 if firm iis a member  of a business  association,  zero  otherwise.
Following  the set-up developed in Recanatini  and Ryterman (1999),  we introduce the
following  structual equation  to estimate  the impact  of membership  on the output decline  of firm i
belonging  to sector  k
Pr[y, = 1]  = Pr[PO  +fPI(PI )+ A3 2(Cl )+ 3(Assoc,)+ X 4(X,  )+  A5(Ai)  +gi  > o]
=-4IPO  +PI  (PI )+ 3 2(cC)+f3 3(Assoc,)+fP 4(Xi )+0 5(Ai)]
where:
-Yi  = 1 means  that firm iexperienced  a decline  in output  between  1991  and 1994;
- P,  represents  the (og of the) change  in prices  for sector  I, with  I,  between  1991  and
1994;
- C 1 describes  the Oog  of the) change  in input  costs  for sector  I,  I,  for the same  period;
- Associ captures  firn i's membership  in business  associations;
- xi  is a vector  of firm  specific  variables  to control  for some other factors  which  may  have
contributed  to the decline  in output  between  1991  and 1994;
- Ai is a vector  of variables  to proxy  for the institutional  changes  and disorganization;
is Our  choice  of creating  this  index  of growth  was  determined  by  the fact  that the survey  provides  information  only  on  the sign  of the change  in
production  after  1991.
11[] is the standard  normal  cumulative  distribution  function.
Equation (1) tries to capture  the essence  of our argument:  firms'  activities  are affected  not
only by changes  in prices,  costs,  or firm-specific  factors,  but also  by the change  in the mechanisms
coordinating  economic  activities.  We separate  the effect of this change  in coordination  regime  into
two different  parts, the "disorganization"  effect,  measured  by Ai, and the "self-organization"  effect,
measured  by Assoc,.
The dismantling  of  the  Soviet coordinating  institutions  translated into  a  wide-spread
"disorganization"  of economic  activities,  which in turn led to an increase  in the costs of search,
contract negotiation,  financing,  and enforcement.  The vector Ai proxies for this change in
coordinating  institutions  and the disorganization,  which followed. We expect these variables  to
affect  negatively  firm's  growth.
But the transition  process forced firms to learn to survive  in a new environment  and, in
particular,  to find new  ways  to coordinate  activities.  The  dummy  Assoc, attempts  to capture these
self-organization  efforts and the institutional  innovation,  which  followed  the initial  disorganization
of the economic  activities. Specifically,  we expect that the dummy Associ will have a positive
impact  on firm's  performance  by  alleviating  the initial  disorganization  shock
Following  the findings  of Recanatini  and Ryterman  (1999),  we then define the vector A, -
the disorganization  effect  of the change  in coordinating  regime  -as follows:
A, =(AU,,Ic,  ds,,  db 1 ,pCMEAEX,,CMEAIM,)
with  I  and where:
- AU,  is a dummy  variable  that takes value  1 if the firm belonged  to an All-Union  sector
during  the Soviet  era, zero  otherwise;
12-Ic, is the index  of complexity  introduced  byBlanchard  and Kremer  and defined  as follows:
Ic  =I-.  Zi 
with zy is the share  of inputjin the production  of good  i"';
- ds,p and db,p are the distance  of potential  suppliers  and buyers,  respectively,  for fins  in
industry  Ilocated  in province  p, and are  defined  as follows":
ds 1 =[Sjj  * Y(C*)Dp)]
db 1p  =  [jI  (Chj  ph  )]
with:
- S, 1 is the share  of input/used in the production  of commnodity  I;
-Bj1 is the share  of output  Ipurchase  byindustryj;
- Cj, is the concentration  of industryjin  province  h in 1990;
- DPh  is a dummy  variable  which  takes  value
- Opif and 13  are  the same  province;
- 1 ifp and h are neighboring  provinces;
-2 otherwise.
16 This  index  was  construtedusing  the  1990  Russian  a1l0-sectors"  in,ut-output  tables.
17 These indices  were  calculated  using  the 1990  Soviet  input-output  Tables.
13- CMEAEX,  the  pre-transition share of  sector I  production  exported  to  countries
belonging to the CMEA 18;
- CMEAIM,  : the pre-transition share of inputs used by sector I imported from countries
belonging to the CMEA.
These  variables  attempt  to  proxy  the  disorganization shock  by  exploiting  different
dirnensions along which economic activities may have been coordinated during the Soviet regime.
The intuition is the following. The Soviet system coordinated activities  and exchanges though the
use  of  government agencies and  ministries.  The transition from  plan  to  market  implied the
dismantling of the old Soviet coordinating institutions with a subsequent increase in transaction
costs for individual  fisrm. This rise in transaction costs varied however across enterprises depending
on  the  pre-existing institutional arrangements existing between firns  and  the government, their
production links, and their spatial  location.
CGonsider,  first, the dummy AU,,  which exploits the institutional heterogeneity in terms of
coordination existing across firms before the transition.  During the Soviet period, firns'  activities
were monitored  and  coordinated  by the  Soviet government.  In  particular, each sector  of the
economy was controlled by  a separate Ministry.  The degree of  control and  coordination  was
however different across sectors.  The activities and exchanges of sectors under the so-called All
Union Ministries  were highly monitored and coordinated. Sectors instead under the Union Republic
or the Republic Ministries were given greater degree of freedom." 9 The dismantling of the Soviet
institutions  halted  this  coordinating activities and  unevenly increased trnsaction  costs  across
s  'The Council  for Mutual  Economic  Assistance,  or CQIEA,  formerly  coordinated  trade  between  Soviet  and East European  countries.
It was  dismantled  in 1991.
14sectors. We should  therefore  expect  that firms more  closely  monitored  by the Soviet  authority,  that
is,  under the control  of an All Union  Ministry  (AU 1 = 1), should  suffer  disorganization  more.
Disorganization  manifested  itself  also  through  the break  up of the very  rigid  production  links
existing  among  finns. Business  relationships  between  finns during  the Soviet  period  not only were
set in fact by the government,  but were also highly  specific  (Blanchard  and Kremer,  1997). This
specificity  on the production side and the potential  bargaining  problems  that could ensue were
controlled  by the central  planner. The transition  process eliminated  the central  authority  without
reducing  the specificity  of these relationships,  opening  the door for bargaining  problems. The index
of product complexity,  Ic,  , captures  this intuition:  the more complex  the product,  the greater  the
specificity  problem  faced  by firms,  and thus the more  likely  is output  to decline.
The third dimension  we use to proxy  for the disorganization  shock  is related  to the spatial
distribution  of enterprises.  Finms,  in fact,  differ  not only  in terms of their pre-existing  institutional
or production  links, but also because  of their geographical  location. The increase  in transaction
costs, which  followed  the removal  of the Soviet  institutions,  was  uneven  across  firms depending  on
the spatial  location  of their alternative  buyers  and suppliers:  the closer  the potential  trading  partners
are,  the smaller  the increase  in transaction  costs  for firm i the less  likely  is production  to collapse.
The indices ds, 1 and db,p capture this type of geographical  heterogeneity  in transaction  costs
existing  across  finns.
Finally,  the last two measures  of the vector Ai focus on the coordination  of international
trade activities  by the CMEA  by capturing  the dependence  of sector  Ion trade via  this institution.
To complete  our specification,  we introduce  the firm-specific  vector x; :




- AGEj  the number of years firm ihas been in business;
- DUR,  the pre-transition index of durability  of sector I.
To summarize, our estimating equation becomes the following: 20
Pr[y, = I] = Pr[1fO  + /3 (PI ) + A2(cl ) +  13 (Assoc)  +  f4  (A GE)
+  I5 (DURI) + 06 (A U1) + 07 (Ic,)  +  8(ds,,) +  fi9 (db 1 p)  (2)
+ Plo3(CMEAEX,)  + PII  (CMEAIM, ) +eF  > 0]
How  will being a  member  in an  association affect  firms' performance?  If  joining an
association is a way to  solve some of the coordination problems faced by firms, then  members
should experience a  smaller decline in output.  Table  8 presents  the  results of  our  estimation
procedure.  This simple exercise suggests that Assoc,  does in fact affect positively firmns.  We could
therefore conclude that associations - as a form of sharing infornation  and coordinating activities  -
help firnMs'  performance at the  beginning of transition.  This conclusion however can be easily
challenged.
The  single-equation model estimated has taken  e,  to  be uncorrelated with the  Associ
dummy.  This can be justified only if we have included in equation (2) all the relevant explanatory
variables. This may not be the case. There may be unobserved factors which affect both  5, and
Assoc,,  leading to a bias in the estimates discussed above.  Specifically,  we believe there  may be
20 Table  6 and  7 provide  summary  statistics  for  these  variables.
16some managerial  characteristic  which  is related  to both firm's  performance  and the decision  to join
an association.
Suppose  for example  we define an omitted  variable  called 'Soviet mentality" (S) which
captures  a manager's  characteristic.  We can reasonably  expect  S to be positively  related  to both the
decline  in output and the decision  to join an association:  high S managers  did not know how to
adjust  to the change  in the system,  and may  have viewed  associations  as a recreation  of the past.
Hence,  if this variable  is omitted,  there will  be a positive  correlation  between  the error terms  and the
single-equation  estimates  will  be upwardly  biased.
To correct  this endogeneity  problem,  we introduce  a second  equation  to explain  the decision
of joining  an association:
: =a*W  +em  (3)
where:
- is the latent  variable  measuring  the benefits  from joining  an association;  and
Associ = 1, when  > 0, zero  otherwise;
- Wi is a vector  of observable  variables  which  influence  ,  ; and
- Cm  is the error term,  where E(e')  =  0
If all the relevant  explanatory  variables  are included  both in equations  (2) and (3), then
E(E'imE) = 0 , and  the single-equation  estimates  are  consistent.  If however,  E(ej7,e)  = p ￿0  (the
unobserved  determinants  of output and association  decision  are  correlated),  then  Ej  and AssocL  are
correlated  and the estimates  obtained  using  the single  equation  approach  are inconsistent. To test
17whether our estimates  are consistent,  i.e. E(e",,)  =p ￿0  , we estimate  equations  (2) and (3)
simultaneously.
But, which variables  affect  the decision  to join an association?  In Section  2, we argue  that
disorganization  in a firm's  relations  with other firms  provides  an important  incentive  for the firm  to
join an association. Thus, we include  in our estimation  variables  related  to disorganization:  the
degree  of government  control  firm  i experienced  during  the Soviet  era (AU,), the distance  of finn i
from its suppliers  and buyers  (ds,p, db,p),  and the complexity  of the production  process (Ic,).  We
expect  the effect of these  variables  on the probability  of joining  to be positive.
Our discussion  in Section  2 also suggests  that the cost of membership,  as well  as the extent
of strategic  complementarities  among  potential  members,  plays  a role in explaining  the membership
decision. Although  technically  beyond  the bounds  of our simple  static model,  we believe  that these
two variables  are important  triggers  for the emergence  of associations.  Unlike  disorganization,  which
provides an incentive  for an individual  firm to search  for an association,  membership  costs and
strategic  complementarities  determine  whether  conditions  are ripe among  a group of firms for the
actual  formation  of an association. Specifically,  the costs of forming  (e.g.,  the total cost of search
for all members)  and operating  an association  (e.g.,  the costs of meetings  and between meeting
commurications)  must be sufficiently  low and strategic  complementarities  among firms must exist
in order for an association  to emerge.
We postulate  that these conditions  are most likely  to met when a sufficient  number  of firms
facing  similar  difficulties  are located  in close  proximity. Proximity  reduces  the cost of forming  and
maintaining  an association,  and similarity  of problems  among firms increases  the likelihood  that
cooperation  will  yield  mutual  benefit. In fact,  we argue  that the most pertinent  form of similarity  for
the formation of an association  is logically  the  potential  disorganization  in  the  firms'
18relationships . Thus, we proxy the role of membership costs and strategic complementarities with
the variable  AU-Ob 1p, which measures the share of finns in a province (oh/ar  that were formally
part of an All-Union Ministry.  We expect that the probability of joining an association is larger if
firn  /ibelongs  to a region which has a greater concentration of controlled firms at the beginning of
transition.
This interpretation of A U - Ob,p - as a triggering  factor for the endogenous coordination of
activities  through the creation of alternative institutions - helps also explain why this variable affects
output, but only indirectly. 2'  It also provides us with a justification  for its use as an instrument for
the  Associ  variable. The resulting system of two equations is in fact identified if we have at least
one instrument for Assoc, , which is not included in the output regression.
To summarize,  the resulting  system to be estimated is:
Pr[y,  = 1] = Pr[flo + P 1 (PI  ) + ,2 (C, ) + P3  (Associ ) +  P4  (A GEi)
+  5 (DUR  ) +  /36 (A U ) +  ,7(Ic,  ) + P.  (dsP ) + i9 (db 1 p)  (2)
+ flo  (CMEAEX1) + ,B,,  (CMEAIM, ) + Ei > 0]
Pr[Associ = 1]  = Pr[50 +'S,  (PI')  +  52 (C 1 ) + 33  (AGE,) +
+54(AU,)+85(Ick)+i6  (dsIp)+5 7(dblp)+5 8(CMEAEX 1)  (3)
+ ±9  (CMEAIM,)  + 610  (AU-Obip  ) +  E( > 01
21 Alternative  interpretations  A U  - Ob  jp are  however  possible,  some  of which  make  it nore  difficult  to justify  the exclusion  of
this  variable  from  the output  regression.  High  values  of A U _ Ob ,p may  in fact  capture  the higher  search  costs  faced  by firm  i
because  of the destruction  of the  information  network  existing  in  her  region.  In this  case  the  variable  should  be included  in  the  output
regression.  Our  argument  however  is that  this increase  in transaction  costs  is  captured  by the transaction  costs  indices  introduced
above,  while  A U - Ob ,  only  captures  the institutional  trigger  for  the  emergence  of associations.
193.2  SELF-ORGANIZATION?
To answer  this question  we test the following  hypotheses:  did the spontaneous  emergence
of altemative  ways  to coordinate  activities  and obtain  information  reduce  the negative  impact  of the
disorganization  shock) And, are business  associations  more likely  to emerge  in regions  where the
incentives  to coordinate  activities  are greater?
In terms of equations  (2) and (3), these hypotheses  imply P3 < 0  and 3,, > 0 ':  being a
member of an association,  by facilitating  coordination  among  firms and reducing  transaction  costs,
decreases  the probability  that output declines. Moreover,  firms are more likely  to join the greater
the incentives  to coordinate  surrounding  them. The estimation  of equation  (3) may also help to
shed some light  on the different  functions  played  by these institutions. A negative  and statistically
significant  13  in fact , though it highlights  the existence  of a link  between  finns' performance  and
coordinating  institutions,  it does not provide  information  on the role  played  by these institutions.
To estimate  equations  (2) and (3') we use a bivariate  prbit  procedure' 3 The results  of this
regression  are  summarized  in Tables  9 and 10.
Two are the key findings  of our exploration.  The first is that the bivariate  probit estimates
of equations  (2) and (3) still  support our hypothesis  (Table  9): output  is less  likely  to decline  if firm
i is a member of a business  association. The average  treatment effect - the difference  in the
probability  of output decline  between  members  and non-members  - suggests  that being  a member
of an association  has a very  strong  impact  on finn performance:  belonging  to an association  reduces
the probability  that output declines  by 47 percent. These findings  therefore strongly  support the
22  Recall  that  {y}  -1 reans that  output  declnecL
23Ignonng  the discreteness  of both  dependent  vanables,  we  could  estimate  this  mnodel  by  using  a standard  linear  procedure.  The  last
cohlmn  of Tables  9 and 10  presents  the results  of the 2SIS  procedure.  These  results  are  consistent  with  the bivariate  probit  results
discussed  below  and  pmvide  xnore  evidence  of the  robustness  of the  'Association'  effect
20importance  of altemative  ways  to coordinate  among  firms and obtain  information  during  tmnsition
in explaining  firms'  performance.
The bivariate  estimation  procedure  also adds a relevant  piece of information  about the
relationship  betveen membership  and output: p  is significantly  different  from zero and positive,
indicating  that the single-equation  estimates  are  inconsistent  and likely  to be upwardly  biased  (i.e.  the
effect  of associations  on output decline  is more  negative  than  equation  (2)  would  imply).  This result
suggests  that the single equation approach  suffered of an omitted variable  problem.  It  also
highlights  the potential  role  of the "Soviet  legacy'  variable.
Few other factors help explain the  decline in output.  Our proxy for  institutional
disorganization  (AP is  statistically  significant  and  positive  (p6 >0)  indicating  that the removal  of the
government  institutions  coordinating  exchanges  did have a negative  impact  on firms. The other
measures  of disorganization  - (Ic,,ds 1 ,,db 1 ,pCMEAEX,,CMEAIM,)  - are instead  not statistically
significant. 24 In addition,  output declines  more  for older  firms than for younger  ones (/34 >0). A
possible  explanation  for this result  is that older firms  are less efficient  and therefore  more likely  to
be in need of restructuring  at the beginning  of the transition. Finally,  higher  prices  also  significantly
reduce  the probability  of output  decline  (fl, <a).
Thus, these results  seem  to suggest  that the dismantling  of the Soviet  coordinating  system,
the emergence  of an altemative  coordinating  system  and the price shock are the most important
factors  in explaining  the output  collapse  at the beginning  of transition.
But, why do firms choose to join a business  association?  The second key finding  of our
analysis  is that firms are affected  by regional  characteristics  in their decision  to join. Specifically,
associations  are more likely  to emerge in regions where the share of firms that were formally
21controlled  by the central  government  is high (3,,, > 0 ).  The analysis  of Table 10 suggests  that the
decision  regarding  membership  is also affected  by the age of the finn (3  > 0) and the change in
prices (3, > 0 ).  The probability  of joining  an association  is greater  for older  firns than for younger
ones,  possibly  because  the former  are  more  likely  to have  been  influenced  more  bythe Soviet  system
and to have  less knowledge  of the market  system  rules. Moreover,  since  firm ijoins an association
in an attempt  to decrease  its transaction  costs,  an increase  in the price  of firm i's product  reduces  the
benefits  from using  this alternative  form of coordinating  activities  and sharing  infornmation.
The geographical  distance of  suppliers instead reduces the probability  of  joining an
association. This somewhat  surprising  result,  suggesting  that associations  among distant  members
are less likely  to arise,  reenforces  our intuition  that local  incentives  to coordinate  are the triggering
factor for the emergence  of these institutions. Distance may in fact make it  more difficult  to
coordinate  activities  with other  members,  reducing  therefore  the usefulness  of business  association.
The other proxies of disorganization  however  are not statistically  significant,  though with the
predtcted sign (84 >o25,  8, > 0 )
This last set of results on the role and the emergence  of associations  is in line with the
theoretical  framework  discussed  in Section  2 and with the studies  of Greif (1989,  1993,  1994)  and
Milgrom  et al. (1990)  on the importance  of historical  institutions  for trade and growth: firms may
attempt to resolve  problems  due to market failures  - such as informnation  asynmmetry  and contract
enforcement  issues  - by joining  efforts with other firms. This strategy,  though potentially  socially
sub-optimal,  improves  the perfornance of each single  firn.  Further work along these lines is
necessary  at this stage  to better understand  the evolution  of these  institutions.
24For  a more  detail  dscussion  on  the  link  between  coordination  problems  and  output,  see  Recanatini  and  Rytenman  (1999).
25 The  positive  coefficient  of AU may  also  suggests  that finns  under  an All-Union  Ministry are more  likely  to join  an association
because  of  the larger  information  loss  brought  by  the transition.
223.3  BUSINESS  ASSOCIATIONS:  WHICH  ROLE?
The results presented in the previous section highlight how somehow business associations
have a positive impact on members' performance. Because of data availability  issues, however, our
analysis cannot sort  through the  competing hypotheses of  why membership in associations is
beneficial for firms.  Do, for example, business associations reduce transaction costs by facilitating
the circulation of information among their members? Or do they mitigate contract negotiation and
enforcement problems? Or do business associations  alleviate  the credit constraints faced by firns?
A closer look to Table 10 indicates that the decision of joining an association is strongly
affected by the institutional vacuum brought by the transition and the  'ki  m7enh*/iay"'  Next, we
discuss the results of a few empirical exercises undertaken with the objective to better understand
the  role of  business associations in  improving firm's performance.  Our  exploration,  though
constrained by data availability  issues, suggests that the beneficial  effects of business associations are
concentrated in their ability to facilitate  contacts with suppliers and customers.  More surprisingly,
associations lead by former official  of a Ministry of the USSR  or Russia seem to have no effect on
firm perforrnance& 6. Finally,  we cannot say whether or not associations facilitate  access to credit, or
help to coordinate activities  with competitors because of the poor performance of the instrument
used.
Specifically,  in the attempt to separate potential functions of associations we build on  the
preliminary evidence presented in Section 2  on  the  composition of  associations and  their key
organizers (Tables 2 and 3).  In fact, being a member of an association that includes suppliers or
financial institutions or was organized by a former official of a Ministry of Russia seems to  be
23associated  to a smaller  lkelihood  of output decline.  We therefore  repeat our bivariate  analysis  only
for the firmns  who are  members  using  a set of modified  membership  variables  defined  as follows 2":
- pSper  = 1 if the association  includes  the most impoztant  suppliers,  zero otherwise;
- Ba&hr  - 1 if the association  includes  financial  institutions  or banks,  zero otherwise;
- C,ro#mr- 1 if the association  includes  the most important  customers,  zero  otherwise;
- Sgay  = 1 if the key organizer is a former official  of a Ministry  of the USSR  or Russia, zero
otherwise;
- Akdney = 1 if the key organizer  is an employee of an industrial  entezprise, zero otherwise.
As anticipated above, the bivariate estimation procedures suggest that the dummies  FSApp&r
and  Cvrlower  significantly  reduce the probability of output decline.  This seems therefore to imply
that  business  associations  provide  valuable  information  to  their  members  about  trading
opportunities and contract enforcement issues. The regressions  with the dummies Banki, Legay and
IZldNry instead do not pmvide us with clear-cut  results. The instrument used in fact in the bivariate
analysis is  not  statistically significant, undermining the  estimation results.  Thus,  we  cannot
understand from our analysis  whether associations facilitate  access to credit or are simply an heredity
of the Soviet regime.
To  conclude,  these  exercises, because  of  the  noisy  measures  used  and  the  limited
performance of the instruments, offer only limited evidence on the different functions potentially
performed by these informal institutions and their impact on output behavior. Their main value is,
however, to set the stage for further discussion and research on the role of these institutions and to
indicate a possible approach to separate different functions.
26 This  result  maybe  driven  by  the  somewhat  poor  performance  of the instournent  used.
27 The  complete  results  of these  regressions  are  available  from  the authors  upon  request.
244.  CONCLUSIONS
Do self-organizing  institutions emerge endogenously? If so, in which circumstances are they
more  likely to  emerge?  And, do  these  institutions significantly affect firm's  activities?  The
illustrative  model and the empirical  evidence presented in this paper provide some answers to these
questions: self-organizing  institutions emerge spontaneously in presence of incentives to coordinate
as a response to the increase in transaction costs.  Furthermore, these alternative institutions have a
positive  impact on  firmns'  performance.  A  brief discussion of these  results will highlight the
importance of these conclusions and emphasize the need for further research.
The  focal  point  of  this  paper  is  the  firm's  response to  the  widespread institutional
disorganization experienced during the transition process.  Blanchard and Kremer (1997) suggest
that  disorganization played a significant role in the  output collapse: 'once  Humpty-Dumpty has
faUlen  down, all the King's horses and all King's men cannot put him back together again".  Our
work begins where theirs ends and shows that the spontaneous emergence of some form of self-
organization is a rational response to  disorganization and mitigates the output decline: all King's
horses and all King's men may have found a different wayto put  -iumpty-Dumpty  back together!
Our empirical  analysis supports these conclusions emphasizing  that being a member of an
association reduces the probability that output declines and can be explained by the extent of the
coordination problems present in the system. These findings help to characterize the endogenous
emergence of associations  as a means of self-coordinating  activities  by sharing information about an
uncertain environment.  Joining a business or a trading association helps firms in fact to  reduce
transaction costs by providing information not only about the location but also the reliability  of the
potential  trading  partners.  IThese findings,  therefore,  suggest  that  disorganization  may
25create  the proper conditions  for the development  of certain  non-market  institutions,  which in tum
play  a role  in explaining  firms'  performance  in an environment  characterized  by some  type of market
failures.
In summary,  this work  sheds  some light  on the complex  relationships  between  firm behavior
and the evolution  of informal  institutions,  opening  the door for further,  much  needed,  discussions.
This perspective on  coordination  problems and self-organizing  mechanisms suggests
potentially  fruitful directions for further empirical  and theoretical  research. The simple model
presented  in Section  2 could  be elaborated  to focus  more  on the evolution  of market institutions  to
better represent  the reality  in which  firns operate. The explicit  introduction  of the accumulation  of
knowledge  on the part of the firns, for example,  may  improve  our understanding  of the evolution
of market  and non-market  institutions  for trade and exchange.
It is also important  to emphasize  that other arguments,  observationally  equivalent  to the one
presented  here based on transaction  costs and institutional  disorganization,  exist  and could be used
to explain  the endogenous  emergence  of business  associations.  The recent advances  in the science
of complexity,  for example,  provide  us with an alternative,  intriguing explanation. This science
suggests that the creation of  complex organizations,  such as associations,  is not  an  unlikely
phenomenon,  but the spontaneous  result of a natural  tendency  of every  system  to create  order in
presence  of some chaos (or "order at the edge  of chaos"). Business  associations  therefore  are most
likely  to emerge  endogenously  in locations  where  disorder  is most likely,  with the effect  of providing
its members  with some amount  of stability  and coordination  and improving  their performance. 28
Few more questions  are left open by this work  This paper provides  evidence  that sectors
under all-union  Ministries  did in fact experience  a larger  decline  in output. We label  this effect as
"the larger  increase  in transaction  costs due to institutional  changes",  but other interpretations  are
26plausible. Although  we have in fact controlled  for many  other factors  which may have affected
output  - such  as the CMEA  collapse,  demand  and supply  shocks  and the durability  of goods  - a few
more may  still  be missing. Among  them, credit  availabity is the first to come to mind: all-union
industries  received  from the central government  not orny the information  but also the credit
resources  necessary  to complete  their trades. The collapse  of the Soviet  system,  therefore,  led to
both a loss of information  and a loss  of credit  resources.  This point  becomes  less relevant,  however,
if we realize  that the information  lost with the transition  was  not only  about  trading  and production,
but also  about  access  to credit  sources.
The previous  remark  is related  to the broader  issue  of the omission  of potentially  important
variables  because  of data availability  problems. In Eastern  Europe  and in Central  Asia,  for example,
researchers  have documented  the somewhat  different  role played  by business  associations.? 9 To
make  this analysis  more  robust,  the collection  of additional  finn-level  data and more empirical  work
are  therefore  necessary.
Cross-country  comparisons  are also needed  to test the robustness  of our findings  and to
reconcile  the observed  discrepancies  in the evolution  of institutions.  Our intuition  suggests  that the
differences  in institutional  pattems between  Eastem Europe, the Former Soviet  Union countries,
and other emerging  economies  may  lay  in the coordinating  mechanisms  existing  before  transition  in
each one of these countries  and in the institutional  disorganization  faced by fimms.  In line  with the
recent works  on groups  in Latin America  and East Asia,  a comparison  between  Russia  and any of
these countries  will  provide  us with further,  deeper  insights  on the possibility  and the role of self-
organizing  institutions  on finn's activities.
28 For a more complete  treatment  of this topic,  see  Kaufmann,  1995.
29See,  for example,  Anderson  (2000)  and  Broadman  (1999).
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29TABLE  1
MEMEBERSHIP  IN  BUSrNESS  ASSOCIATIONS
(Fssia, 157  finns)
Yes  42.3%
TABLE 2
WHO IS THE KEY  ORGANiZER  OF YOUR ASSOCIATION?
(RBssia,  58 firms)
A former official  of a Ministry  of Russia  21%
Other.  24.6%
TABLE 3
WHO DOES  BELONG  TO YOUR  ASSOCIATION?
(Russia,  58 firms)
5M  UM-M-1  MMM.  TMI''  r
Your most important customers  39%
Financial  institutions.  36.7%
30  Of the 157  fimns  interviemed,  58 responded  that  they  were  rnember  of an association,  79 that they  were  not, and 20 did  not
respond.
30TABLE 4
PERCEIVED  BENEFITS  OF MEMBERSHIP
(Russia,  58  fimns)
You  decided  to johy.  ,  as.ia  .. becaxse  it helpmvts.  --
Access to capital at market interest rates  24.6%
Access to capit  cheaply,  40.3%
Access to important material  inputs  55.2%
Access to i  oti ±tpo~  09
The association  is not expensive  8.8%
TABLE 5
ALTERNATIVE  SUPPLIERS  AND CUSTOMERS
(Rusia,  58  finns)
Members  Non-members
Are  you aware  of  (percentage  of YES)  (percentage  of YES)
- alterntive supp^e ?  68.2%
_otential customers?  1  61.1%  44.7%
31TABLE 6
DISCRE  TE VARIABLES  BY  REGION
Vte.  Bamaul  Yekaterinburg  Novorsibisk  Saratov  Voronezh  Total
iiip;vIin-  22  24  24  17  23  110
A13iiit..  18  21  21  23  13  96
30  30  30  36  31  156
'Number  of firms
TABLE 7
CoNTINuous  VARIABLES  BY REGION
. ati:a2i,j  j.j4,tifr  <X20'  Barnaul  Yekaterinburg  Novorsibisk  Saratov  Voronezh  Total
1.52503  1.50948  1.54319  1.53227  1.49177  1.5239
1.4504  1.48207  1.33821  1.284  15544  1.4218
_  ~~~0.793  0.803  0.837  0.84  0.803  0.807
7.0867  5.7967  2.4897  6.7686  5.5931  6.2039
18.263  19.21  20.307  23.58  26.24  22.81
0.6792  0.449  0.7639  0.8985  0.5246  0.6766
1.9253  1.7655  1.9146  1.8728  1.863  1.8686
2.3693  2.0751  2.2862  2.407  2.1957  2.3318
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BIVARIATE PROB1T MODEL
DEPENDENT:  OUTPuT  DECLINE
Single Probit
Vadgbies  ~Coefficient  PValue(CHI)  >'  PqsC1
luteicept  ~~6.2003  0.2835
LogPzioe.  ..~4-3007*a*  0.0412 
Log Cost.  0.0359  0.856  ' 
vAG  S mE  g  |  g g  0.0141*  0.041
DUR.~~~~~~0.0191  0.161  t*~?f45
AU  1~~~~~~14301*  0.0025  ..  .29
Ic  ~~~~~~-  3321  0.3139  *16063
,  ; ~~  ~  ~~~  ~  ~~~  ~  ~~~  ~  ~~~  ~  ~~~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  .
DS  0.2947 RHO08  -04510  038908
1)8  ~~~~~0.1764  0.6979  03
-0.0221  0.3575
(~~ME&B( ~~-0.0049  0.7325  O0k  . 9,3
ASSOCIATION  ~~-.5845*  0.0539  469"
|AVERAGE  TREA1INT EFFECT  -OA731*  0.1445  (SE)  |
Observations:  123
Signdicant  at the  5% . Significant  at the 100/oTABLE10
BIVARIATE  PROB1T  M1DEL
DEPENDENtI. ASSOCrATON
Single  Probit  Poit  model
- V  .wi  t;,Coefflcient  PVahle(CHI)  C  G;t  -v
(BETA=0)  .-  .01
17.08*  0.0075  .:-  04)51
^  >^>  -7.385"  0.0006  -7--  -- 011
0.2410  03267  04  0.Q753
0.0321"  0.0001  0.032W  00013
AIJ  0.2786  0.4763  0.56-2
L7238  0.1849  -;-  0X%
--1--6;  - - -5.971"i  0.0411  -L  - - 0088
-u  B--  - - X0.014  0.9742  -^06  0
(%.E&E-  48-s;-  0.0025  0.9128  44*  04
0.0119  0.4265  -i  0.2526
AU 0  -;  2.059"*  0.021  7593**  0.0427
[  Observations:  123
* Signifra at  the  5%  . * Signfa  at  the  1P/o.APPENDIX  1
Result 1: In the neighborhood of a locally  stable equaibrium, a deterioration in the economic
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In the neighborhood of a locally  stable equilibrium,  the denominator  of this expression is always
positive.  The numerator is positive if
B
is positive,  since f(e*)  is positive by definition.
QED.
Result 2: In the neighborhood of a locally  stable equilibrium,  a decrease in the costs of joining an
association  increases  the equilibrium  membership rate, i.e.
da
Proof: Define
dy  f (e )
docx  1_8*f(e*)
In the neighborhood of a locally  stable equilibrium,  the denominator of this expression is always
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